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Abstract 
Research on the folk psychology of free will suggests that people believe free will is 
incompatible with determinism and that human decision-making cannot be exhaustively 
characterized by physical processes. Some suggest that certain elements of Western 
cultural history, especially Christianity, have helped to entrench these beliefs in the folk 
conceptual economy. Thus, on the basis of this explanation, one should expect to find 
three things: (1) a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, 
(2) that people with predominantly incompatibilist commitments are likely to exhibit 
stronger dualist beliefs than people with predominantly compatibilist commitments, and 
(3) people who self-identify as Christians are more likely to be dualists and 
incompatibilists than people who do not self-identify as Christians. We present the results 
of two studies (n = 378) that challenge two of these expectations. While we do find a 
significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, we found no 
significant difference in dualist tendencies between compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
Moreover, we found that self-identifying as Christian did not significantly predict 
preference for a particular metaphysical conception of free will. This calls into question 
assumptions about the relationship between beliefs about free will, dualism, and 
Christianity. 
 
Introduction 
Kant famously argued that human beings could be free only if there is some realm of 
objects that exists outside the natural world that serves as the ground of freedom (Kant, 
1998: A545/B563). Kant represents an extreme view within a tradition of theorists who 
see a tension between free will and naturalism, or the thesis that everything either is or is 
constituted by physical entities. Spinoza occupies the other extreme. He accepts that the 
laws of nature causally necessitate the activity of every natural entity. People, being parts 
of nature, are determined to behave as they do by the laws of nature, thereby excluding 
freedom (Ethics Ip32). 
 2	
 
One rough reconstruction of the line of thinking underlying this tradition is the following. 
Freedom is incompatible with either determinism or randomness. Our best scientific 
theories claim that the natural world is either fundamentally deterministic or random and, 
hence, that the activity of entities in this world are either completely determined or 
wholly random. So, believing that anything acts freely is inconsistent with a mature 
scientific view of the world. Kant’s response to this argument is to say that naturalism is 
false and there is something beyond the natural world that preserves freedom, while 
Spinoza responds by rejecting freedom and upholding naturalism. 
 
This line of thinking does not accurately capture the wide range of views of 
contemporary theorists working on the problem of free will. Many accept the claim that 
freedom is compatible with determinism, and one alleged theoretical virtue of 
compatibilism is its congruence with a naturalist view of the world (Mele, 2014; 
Nahmias, 2014; Vargas, 2014). Moreover, there are others who accept the incompatibility 
of free will and determinism, but reject the claim that naturalism rules out freedom. Some 
have proposed metaphysical frameworks consistent with naturalism that can account for 
an incompatibilist view of free will (see Jacobs & O’Connor, 2013; Timpe & Jacobs, 
2016; Steward, 2012; Lowe, 2013). 
 
While the traditional line of thinking about free will might depart significantly from the 
professional opinions of contemporary academics, the argument still seems to accurately 
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characterize commonsense thinking about free will. Consider the following perspectives 
on everyday opinions of free will: 
 
“Free will is the idea that we make choices and have thoughts independent of 
anything remotely resembling a physical process” (Montague, 2008: 584). 
 
“Most people’s view of the mind is implicitly dualist and libertarian1” (Greene & 
Cohen, 2004: 1779). 
 
Some experimental work on intuitions about free will supports this characterization of 
folk thinking. In one of the earliest studies of people’s beliefs about free will, Nichols & 
Knobe (2007) found that a majority of people gave responses that aligned with 
incompatibilism when presented with abstract moral scenarios and questions. Other 
empirical work shows that people think human decision-making is the only process that is 
exempt from the constraints of physical laws (Knobe, 2014). Recent work reveals 
connections between belief in free will and belief in dualism (see Nadelhoffer et al., 
2014; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).2 
 
While this seems to support the characterization of folk thinking as inherently 
incompatibilist and dualist, other experimental work has provided some modest 
pushback. Nahmias and colleagues have found that when people are prompted to make 
	
1 A libertarian about free will is committed to the truth of two claims: (1) It is not possible for anything to 
have free will in a universe where the thesis of determinism is true, and; (2) At least one thing in this 
universe has free will for at least one moment in time. 
2 We provide more precise characterizations of physicalism and naturalism in the General Discussion. 
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judgments of free will in response to concrete cases, people have robustly compatibilist 
intuitions (Nahmias et al., 2005, 2006; see also Murray & Nahmias, 2014). Moreover, 
both Monroe & Malle (2010) and Nahmias (2011) found no evidence that belief in free 
will requires belief in substance dualism. 
 
Two responses have been made to address these apparently conflicting findings. The first 
is clarification. Research has shown relationships between free will belief and the 
rejection of reductive physicalism (De Brigard, Mandelbaum, & Ripley, 2009; Deery, 
Davis, & Carey, 2014; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). Thus, belief in free will presupposes 
that, for example, the mind does not reduce to the brain or that human behavior cannot be 
exhaustively characterized in terms borrowed from the sciences. These claims hardly 
constitute an acceptance of substance dualism. The second is to concede that people 
might not exhibit unified thinking about free will. Our ordinary folk conceptions of 
various phenomena are likely patchwork collections of different criteria that differentially 
inform judgments across contexts. The claim that folk thinking is incompatibilist merely 
requires that incompatibilist commitments constitute at least part of our ordinary 
conception, even if compatibilist commitments can be activated in certain contexts (see 
Vargas, 2013: 37-40; cf. Knobe and Doris, 2010). Further, it should be noted that the 
connection between free will belief and dualism has recently been replicated in a large-
scale multi-cultural study, thereby offering support to the idea that there are important 
connections between dualism and free will in the folk concept (see Wisniewski, 
Deutschländer, and Haynes, 2019). 
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This experimental work has converged on three findings: (1) many people believe that 
human beings have free will; (2) this belief in free will correlates highly with belief in 
dualism, and; (3) many people have a (perhaps context-sensitive) belief in 
incompatibilism. 
 
Some have suggested that elements of Western cultural history have helped entrench 
these elements in the folk conceptual economy. Christianity packages dualism, 
incompatibilism, and belief in free will into a complete metaphysical/theological view. 
Some strands in Christian theology posit incompatibilism as a way of reconciling the co-
existence of an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God with the existence of moral evil 
while absolving God of moral responsibility for such evils. Further, the Christian 
intellectual tradition typically trades in ontologies that include irreducible non-physical 
entities (souls, minds, etc.). Jesus himself seems to endorse a distinction between the 
physical and the spiritual realms, saying: “…the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is 
weak” (Matt. 26:41, ESV translation). The Catechism of the Catholic Church reifies this 
statement into a metaphysical principle:  
 
The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul 
to be the ‘form’ of the body: i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the 
body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in 
man, are not two nature united, but rather their union forms a single nature 
(§365). 
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This does not show that belief in dualism and incompatibilism are constitutive of 
membership in the Christian faith; rather, the argument is that the framework of 
Christianity brings with it demanding ontological commitments. Because Christians are 
antecedently committed to a metaphysically thick framework, the conceptual cost of 
committing to libertarian forms of agency are lowered (see Vargas, 2013: 40-43). As 
Manuel Vargas puts it: “…a libertarian conception of agency might seem a reasonable 
corollary to a dualistic metaphysics” (Vargas, 2013: 41). 
 
If this diagnosis is correct, we should expect to see the following three things: 
1) A significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will. 
2) People with predominantly incompatibilist commitments are likely to exhibit 
stronger dualist beliefs than people with predominantly compatibilist 
commitments. 
3) People who self-identify as Christians are more likely to be dualists and 
incompatibilists than people who do not self-identify as Christians. 
 
While there is some evidence to support each of these claims, there is also reason for 
doubt. For one, there is a rich tradition within Christian intellectual history of 
compatibilists, including Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Calvin, Luther, Locke, Leibniz, 
and Jonathan Edwards (among others). The Christian tradition is certainly not 
homogenous with respect to theories of free will.3  
	
3 In fact, Pope Clement VIII issued a decree in 1611 (and again in 1625) prohibiting further discussion on 
the relationship between efficacious grace and free will. This prohibition reinforced the 1597 decision to 
abstain from adjudicating the dispute between the Dominicans and the Jesuits on grace and free will. In 
short, the Catholic Church decided to remain officially undecided on matters pertaining to free will. The 
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Likewise, Christianity has a complicated relationship with dualistic metaphysics. 
Consider another passage from the Catechism: 
 
Sometimes the soul is distinguished from the spirit: St. Paul for instance 
prays that God may sanctify his people ‘wholly’, with ‘spirit and soul and 
body’ kept sound and blameless at the Lord’s coming. The Church teaches 
that this distinction does not introduce a duality into the soul (§367; 
emphasis added). 
 
Hobbes and Leibniz also reject dualism, though in opposite directions. Hobbes thought 
that the metaphysical ground floor consisted in material substances (bodies) and that 
phrases like ‘incorporeal substance’ were nonsensical (see Leviathan 4.20-1). Leibniz, on 
the other hand, held that fundamental reality consisted in minds and that non-mental 
entities are merely aspects of qualitative features of minds (Leibniz, 1965: 270). 
Members of the Christian intellectual tradition do not unanimously endorse a single 
metaphysical framework for characterizing free will. 
 
We designed a series of studies to test these predictions about the folk conceptual 
framework of free will. Using the recently developed Free Will Inventory (Nadelhoffer et 
al., 2014), we measured belief in free will and dualism. We also included a forced choice 
item associated with either an incompatibilist or compatibilist conception of free will. We 	
Church teaches only that human beings have free will, not to any substantive theory thereof: “Man is 
rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his acts” (§1730). 
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find that the relationship between free will, dualism, and Christianity is more complicated 
than has been previously admitted. This sheds further light on the structure of the folk 
conceptual framework concerning free will. 
 
1. Study 1 
1.1 Participants 
Complete data sets and analyses can be found at: https://osf.io/cfdv3/. As we discuss 
below, the experiments we conducted were part of a larger, multi-factorial design 
developed for other purposes (the data and pre-registrations for this larger study can be 
found at https://osf.io/y3jeb/). Data and analyses for the studies reported here were 
conducted in accordance with pre-registered analyses for these other experiments. We 
indicate any post-hoc analyses that go beyond the original pre-registration and did not 
collect additional participants beyond what was planned in the pre-registration. 
 We recruited 200 participants to take part in a study on free will intuitions on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.4 1 participant failed to complete the study and we excluded 
9 participants who failed an attention check (final n = 190).5 Participants had to satisfy 
three conditions to qualify for the study: (a) they needed to have successfully completed 
	
4 MTurk is an online survey service that enables researchers to recruit and pay for participants for 
completing surveys of studies. For findings concerning the benefits of using MTurk—including the quality 
of the data and the improved diversity of the participant pool—see Burhmester, Kwang, & Gosling (2011); 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis (2010); Rand (2012). We also note that, while MTurk samples are 
representative of populations in WEIRD countries across many dimensions, they are typically much more 
likely to be atheist or agnostic relative to the general population (see Lewis et al., 2015). 
5 The two attention checks we used read: 
1. Monday is the first day of the week. What is the third day of the week? 
2. January is the first month of the year. What is the fifth month of the year? 
Participants could select their answers from a list of five options. The checks were included to ensure that 
participants were paying attention to the survey and not simply clicking through to get a compensation 
code.  
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at least 500 HITS in the past, (b) they needed a HIT success completion rate of at least 
97%, and (c) they needed to be located in the United States. On average, participants took 
about 13 minutes to complete the study. They were paid $1.00 for participating. The 
demographics for the 190 participants were as follows: Mage = 37.6 years, SD = 10.9, 
rangeage = [19 – 70], 37.9% females, 70% Caucasian. The Institutional Review Board of 
the College of Charleston approved this study. 
 
1.2 Methods & Materials 
Study 1 used a within-subjects design with seven stages. The principal aim of the study 
was to examine participants’ comprehension of deterministic features of stimuli typically 
used in experimental studies of free will intuitions. Many of the stages used for that aim 
are not relevant to the present research question, so we do not describe them. There are 
four relevant stages. First, participants were asked to select between two statements that 
describe a way of thinking about free will: 
 
1. To have free will is to be able to make different choices but only if something 
leading up to your choice (e.g., the past, the situation, and your desires, beliefs, 
etc.) had been different. 
2. To have free will is to be able to make different choices even if everything 
leading up to your choice (e.g., the past, the situation, and your desires, beliefs, 
etc.) had been exactly the same. 
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The first option aligns with a conception of free will amenable to compatibilism (see 
Lewis, 1981), while the second option aligns with a conception of free will amenable to 
incompatibilism (see van Inwagen, 2004). After making a selection, participants were 
presented with three subscales of the Free Will Inventory (FWI: see Nadelhoffer et al., 
2014): the free will subscale, the determinism subscale, and the dualism subscale. 
Because the determinism subscale is not relevant, we omit further discussion of it. 
Participants rated agreement with each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The items are listed below. 
 
Free Will subscale 
- People always have the ability to do otherwise. 
- People always have free will. 
- How people’s lives unfold is completely up to them. 
- People ultimately have complete control over their decisions and their actions. 
- People have free will even when their choices are completely limited by external 
circumstances. 
 
Dualism subscale 
- The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our material bodies is what 
makes humans unique. 
- Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just 
in terms of our brains. 
- Each person has a non-physical essence that makes that person unique. 
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- The human mind cannot simply be reduced to the brain. 
- The human mind is more than just a complicated biological machine. 
 
Note that the Free Will subscale measures belief in the existence of free will, though the 
questions are neutral between incompatibilist-friendly or compatibilist-friendly 
conceptions of free will. Hence, the Free Will subscale is not as theoretically loaded as 
the forced-choice item. 
 Participants then performed a distractor task, read a vignette, and answered some 
questions about the vignette. These were not relevant to the current research, so we do 
not describe them here. After this, we re-administered the FWI scales to ensure that 
reading the vignettes was not dramatically altering FWI responses. Finally, participants 
were presented with the forced-choice items. We wanted to make it more difficult for 
people to complete the second round of FWI items by simply selecting the answers they 
used before, so we interspersed ten items from the Humility Scale (Wright et al., 2017) 
with the items from FWI for both the pre- and post-administration of FWI. All items were 
randomly presented. We collected demographic information from participants at the end 
of the study, including religious affiliation. Participants had the option to self-identify 
with a religious group from a drop-down menu that included: Christianity, Hindu, Islam, 
Buddhism, Judaism, Atheism, Agnosticism, Other, None. 
 
1.3 Results 
To categorize FWI scale responses, we computed the average of responses on each 
subscale. Mean scores above (but not including) 4 were counted as agreement, while 
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anything below (but not including) 4 was counted as disagreement. Hence, an average 
score above 4 on the free will subscale indicates belief in free will, an average score 
above 4 on the determinism subscale indicates belief in determinism, and an average 
score above 4 on the dualism subscale indicates belief in dualism. 
 80% of participants (n = 152) registered belief in free will and 76.3% of 
participants (n = 145) registered belief in dualism. 79.5% of participants (n = 151) agreed 
with the incompatibilist conception of free will on the forced choice item, whereas 20.5% 
(n = 39) agreed with the compatibilist conception of free will. These numbers exceed the 
number of participants who believe in free will, though this might be due to the fact that 
some people think free will has a certain structure, but the conditions for having free will 
are not satisfied in our universe.6 
 We collected data about participant’s free will and dualism beliefs at the 
beginning and the end of the study. An independent samples t-test revealed significant 
differences between these scores for both dualism (t(189) = -2.45, p < .05) and free will 
(t(189) = -2.08, p < .05) ratings. However, mean ratings for each category were very 
similar (beginning dualism M = 4.85 (SD=1.61), end dualism M = 4.94 (SD=1.64), 
beginning free will M = 5.06 (SD=1.33), end free will M = 5.16 (SD=1.36)). We ran 
simple linear regressions to test the relation between pre- and post-assessment scores. 
Dualism scores were highly correlated (r = .948, p < .001) and free will scores were 
highly correlated (r = .888, p < .001). Moreover, the correlations we report below do not 
change significantly in virtue of using pre- or post-assessment scores. So, even though we 
	
6 That is, some participants might think that free will is incompatible with determinism, thereby selecting 
the incompatibilist forced-choice item. But, these same participants think that the universe is deterministic, 
so they do not believe that anyone in this universe has free will. 
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found a statistically significant difference in ratings offered at the beginning of the 
assessment and at the end, the strong correlations indicate that these answers are similar. 
Thus, for simplicity, we report statistical tests for a single time point (pre-assessment 
scores). All correlations are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Correlations for all Dependent Variable between all Time Points 
 Pre-Dualism Post-Dualism Pre-Free Will Post Free Will 
Pre-Dualism  .948** .395** .352** 
Post-Dualism .948**  .379** .381** 
Pre-Free Will .395** .379**  .888** 
Post-Free Will .352** .381** .888**  
** = p < .001 
 
 Belief in dualism and belief in free will were significantly correlated (r = .395, p 
< .001). However, participants who selected the compatibilist forced-choice item scored 
higher on the dualism subscale on average than participants who selected the 
incompatibilist forced-choice item (Compatibilist: M = 5.13, SD = 1.28; Incompatibilist: 
M = 4.78, SD = 1.68). An independent samples t-test did not identify a statistically 
significant difference between these average ratings (t(75.89) = -1.45, p > .05). 
 At the end of the study, 187 participants self-identified as affiliating with a 
particular religious group (see Table 2) 
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Table 2. Breakdown of Religious Affiliation in Study 1 with Dualism and Free Will 
Ratings 
Religion Number Free Will (SD) Dualism (SD) 
Christian 95 5.37 (1.07) 5.56 (1.1) 
Agnostic 23 5.49 (1.07) 3.94 (1.77) 
Atheist 34 4.62 (1.5) 3.60 (1.61) 
Other 12 5.43 (.55) 5.33 (.63) 
None 23 5.49 (1.07) 3.94 (1.77) 
 
An independent samples t-test identified a significant relationship between dualism and 
religious affiliation (F(4, 182) = 17.80, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons 
showed that those who identified as Christian rated dualism statistically significantly 
higher than all other religious groups (all p < .001).  
 We conducted a chi-square test of independence to examine the relationship 
between religion and belief in incompatibilism. Results indicated that those who 
identified as Christians were statistically significantly more likely to be incompatibilists 
than members of other religious groups (c2(4, N=187) = 12.56, p = .014). See Table 3 for 
expected and observed counts.  
 
Table 3. Expected Counts of Compatibilists and Incompatibilists by Religious Affiliation 
in Study 1 
  Christianity Other Atheist Agnostic None Total 
Compatibilist Count 37 7 7 4 4 59 
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 Expected 30 3.8 10.7 7.3 7.3 59 
Incompatibilist Count 58 5 27 19 19 128 
 Expected 65 8.2 23.3 15.7 15.7 128 
Total Count 95 12 34 23 23 187 
 Expected 95 23 34 23 23 187 
 
1.4 Discussion 
 We found, in support of the popular characterization of free will and dualism 
beliefs, that there is a moderate correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free 
will. However, contrary to the popular characterization, we found that compatibilists 
exhibit equally strong belief in dualism as incompatibilists. Religion also played an 
important role. Christians were more likely to exhibit both dualist beliefs and select the 
incompatibilist forced-choice item relative to members of other religious groups. 
However, as the expected counts show, there are more Christians that identify as 
compatibilist than is expected and fewer Christians who identify as incompatibilist than is 
expected. This pattern is reversed in other religious groups. So even though Christians are 
more likely to exhibit stronger dualist tendencies relative to members of other religious 
groups, there is not a clear propensity to identify as incompatibilist relative to other 
religious groups.   
 Hence, we find partial support for part of the popular characterization. Christians 
are more likely than others to exhibit dualist beliefs. However, contrary to the popular 
characterization, we found that compatibilists and incompatibilists have similar levels of 
belief in dualism. 
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 We conducted another study to see if these results replicate. 
 
2. Study 2 
2.1 Participants 
We recruited 200 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 198 participants 
completed the study. Conditions to qualify for the study were the same as Study 1. On 
average, participants took about 15 minutes to complete the study, and they were paid $1 
for participating. We excluded 10 participants who failed either of two attention checks 
(final n = 188; Mage = 35.7 years, SD = 10.7 rangeage = [19-70], 32% females, 66% 
Caucasian). The Institutional Review Board of the College of Charleston approved this 
study. 
 
2.2 Methods & Materials 
We used the same methods and materials as in Study 1 with one exception. We used a 
different vignette in this study. However, like the previous study, this vignette (and the 
subsequent responses) is not relevant to the current research, so we do not describe these 
materials further. 
 
2.3 Results 
Similar to Study 1, we again found high rates of belief in free will (80.3%, n = 151), 
belief in dualism (75%, n = 141), and belief in incompatibilism (69%, n = 129). We also 
found a modest correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will (r = .285, p < 
.001). An independent samples t-test revealed no statistically significant difference 
 17	
between pre- and post-assessment ratings of dualism or free will. For this reason, we do 
not report all correlations between dependent variables at all time points. Instead, for 
simplicity, we simply report correlations using pre-assessment ratings. 
 Similar to Study 1, participants who selected the compatibilist item scored higher 
on the dualism subscale relative to incompatibilists (Compatibilist: M = 5.24, SD = 1.18; 
Incompatibilist: M = 4.67, SD = 1.68). An independent samples t-test revealed a 
statistically significant difference between these groups (t(186) = 2.381, p = .017). 
 We again found a significant relationship between religious affiliation and belief 
in dualism. Two participants did not disclose their religious affiliation, resulting in 186 
participants for these analyses. Table 4 describes the number of participants in each 
religious group, as well as their respective mean scores on the free will and dualism 
subscales. 
 
Table 4. Breakdown of Religious Affiliation in Study 2 with Dualism and Free Will 
Ratings 
Religion Number Free Will (SD) Dualism (SD) 
Christian 85 5.38 (1.11) 5.61 (1.02) 
Agnostic 30 4.75 (1.27) 4.39 (1.52) 
Atheist 26 4.68 (1.83) 3.58 (1.77) 
Other 7 4.60 (0.59) 4.37 (1.6) 
None 38 5.03 (1.42) 4.46 (1.90) 
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An independent sample t-test indicated a statistically significant relationship between 
dualism and religious affiliation (F(4, 181) = 12.49, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni 
comparisons showed that those who identified as Christians rated dualism statistically 
significantly higher all other religious groups (all p < .001) except for Other. However, 
this lack of significant difference may stem from the fact that this category included too 
few participants for us to make reliable and valid comparisons.   
 We conducted a chi-square test of independence to measure the relationship 
between religion and belief in incompatibilism. Unlike Study 1, we did not find a 
significant difference between groups (c2(4, N=186) = 7.080, p = .132). Thus, selecting 
the incompatibilist item over the compatibilist item did not differ significantly by 
religious affiliation. We found a similar pattern in expected counts as in Study 1 (see 
Table 5). 
Table 5. Expected Counts of Compatibilists and Incompatibilists by Religious Affiliation 
in Study 2 
  Christianity Other Atheist Agnostic None Total 
Compatibilist Count 22 3 2 5 6 38 
 Expected 17.4 1.4 5.3 6.1 7.8 38 
Incompatibilist Count 63 4 24 25 32 148 
 Expected 67.6 5.6 20.7 23.9 30.2 148 
Total Count 85 7 26 30 38 186 
 Expected 85 7 26 30 38 186  
 
2.4 Discussion 
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We replicated the correlation between belief in free will and belief in dualism. In this 
study, we also found that selection of the compatibilist item corresponds with 
significantly higher ratings on the dualism subscale relative to those that select the 
incompatibilist item. This cuts against the popular characterization that belief in dualism 
goes hand in hand with incompatibilist conceptions of free will, though we do find that 
belief in free will is associated with belief in dualism. 
 We also did not replicate the finding that Christians are much more likely than 
others to select the incompatibilist item. This provides further support for the claim that 
Christianity does not predict allegiance to one or another metaphysical conception of free 
will. 
 
3. General Discussion 
John Calvin once wrote that “Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the 
heavenly science” (Commentary on 1 Corinthians 1:19-20). We are not here to engage in 
heavenly science or weigh in on the finer points of Calvinist theology. We do, however, 
think that there is a smoke screen surrounding contemporary characterizations of the 
psychological relationship between belief in free will, dualism, and Christianity. We hope 
that our results are a first attempt to pierce through this smoke screen to reveal a more 
complicated underlying reality. 
 Recall that we wanted to test three claims: 
1) There is a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will. 
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2) People with predominantly incompatibilist commitments are likely to exhibit 
stronger dualist beliefs than people with predominantly compatibilist 
commitments. 
3) People who self-identify as Christians are more likely to be dualists and 
incompatibilists than people who do not self-identify as Christians. 
Across two studies, we found good support for the first claim. There is a modest 
correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will. We did not find evidence 
supporting the second claim. In one study, we found no difference between the dualism 
ratings of compatibilists and incompatibilists. In another study, we found that people who 
made responses consistent with a compatibilist conception of free will scored 
significantly higher on the dualism subscale relative to those whose responses are 
consistent with an incompatibilist conception of free will. Thus, compatibilists exhibit 
stronger dualist tendencies relative to incompatibilists. Finally, our results were mixed 
with respect to the final claim. In one study, we found that Christians were significantly 
more likely to make responses consistent with incompatibilism relative to members who 
self-identify as part of a different religious group. However, we did not replicate this 
finding in a follow-up study. We also observed more Christians aligning with 
compatibilism than expected and fewer Christians aligning with incompatibilism than 
expected (we found the reverse trend in other religious groups). 
 Before drawing any conclusions, we want to point out two important limitations 
of our studies related to our sample. Population samples from MTurk draw extensively 
from WEIRD (Western, European, Industrialized, Rich, Developed) countries, with 
around 75% of workers located in the United States. Experiments conducted in non-
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WEIRD populations (or on non-WEIRD samples) tend to vary from those conducted in 
WEIRD populations (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Given that our 
experiments deal with institutions and practices that are subject to substantial degrees of 
cultural influence, we need to be cautious about over-generalizing our results. Moreover, 
MTurk workers tend to be much less religious (i.e., either agnostic or atheist) relative to 
the general population (see Lewis, Djupe, Mockabee, & Su-Ya Wu, 2015). This means 
that the religious ideology of the average MTurk worker (and the related web of 
interconnected beliefs that include religiously motivated views about free will) might 
diverge from the general population. Further work should be done to replicate these 
results with non-online samples to validate the current findings. 
 We think that these results indicate something interesting about people’s 
underlying beliefs about free will. At its core, the debate between incompatibilism and 
compatibilism that forms part of the problem of free will is a conceptual debate about the 
logical relationship between free will and the truth of determinism. People who work on 
the problem of free will see an important connection to naturalism because 
incompatibilist forms of agency are seen as more demanding than compatibilist forms of 
agency relative to standards of naturalistic plausibility (see Vargas, 2013: 66-67). Thus, 
someone committed to naturalism might adopt a compatibilist view of free will as a way 
of accommodating naturalist tendencies. This supports the illusion that incompatibilist 
views of free will align with dualism and compatibilist views of free will align with a 
rejection of dualism. 
 Our results show that this is not an accurate characterization of people’s 
underlying beliefs. Instead, there is a relationship between belief in free will and belief in 
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physicalism (or, more properly, reductive forms of physicalism). Roughly, naturalism is 
an ontological thesis about what kinds of things exist. On most versions of naturalism, the 
only things that exist are part of the natural world and could, at least in principle, be the 
object of scientific inquiry.7 Physicalism is the thesis that everything that exists is 
fundamentally composed of physical elements (put another way, physicalism is the thesis 
that there is nothing over and above physical objects, laws, events, and properties). One 
version of physicalism (reductive physicalism) holds that the behavior of everything can 
be exhaustively characterized in terms that are acceptable to a theory of physics. Another 
version of physicalism (non-reductive, or emergent, physicalism) holds that there are 
parts of reality over and above the physical. For example, there might be laws of biology, 
psychology, or economics that are essential to describing reality but nevertheless cannot 
be reduced to laws of physics. Note that, when distinguished in this way, physicalism 
entails naturalism, though naturalism does not entail a specific version of physicalism 
(the entailments are a little trickier than we let on here; see Kim, 2011). 
 Our results indicate that belief in free will correlates with a rejection of reductive 
physicalism. That is, if free will exists, then it must be composed of something above and 
beyond the scope of physics. People tend to exhibit anti-reductionist biases, seeing 
mechanistic characterizations of behavior and thought as inconsistent with free will and 
responsibility (see De Brigard, Mandelbaum, & Ripley, 2009). This suggests that people 
view free will as an emergent property, and might explain why people believe that free 
will is grounded in having a non-physical mind or immaterial soul. However, our 
	
7 This is a description of ontological naturalism. A related thesis is methodological naturalism, which 
concerns the proper principles that guide scientific inquiry. The two theses are distinct, however, and we 
will concern ourselves only with the ontological form of naturalism. 
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measures do not allow us to sort out whether free will beliefs are driven by a positive 
belief in metaphysical dualism or a rejection of reductive physicalism. 
 Our results about the relationship between Christianity, dualism, and 
incompatibilism are not straightforward. In one study, we found that self-identifying as a 
Christian predicts incompatibilism more than any other religious affiliation. However, we 
did not replicate this result in Study 2. Hence, we think more work should be done to 
uncover the conceptual and psychological relationships between religious affiliation, 
dualism, and free will beliefs. 
 This work speaks to some potential concerns about motivated reasoning and 
belief in free will. Manuel Vargas notes that a conspicuously large percentage of 
academic philosophers who are incompatibilists also self-identify as Christians. The same 
contingent connections appear to characterize commonsense thinking about free will. 
That is, self-identifying as a Christian seems to lower the conceptual cost of adopting 
libertarian commitments, which might encourage Christians to rationalize poor arguments 
in favor of incompatibilism as convincing. Vargas calls this the Runeberg problem, and 
marks it out as a distinct form of hindsight bias in service of justifying religious 
commitments (Vargas, 2016). 
 The current research provides a more nuanced view of commonsense thinking 
about free will. There appears to be nothing about Christianity that inclines people toward 
adopting a substantive metaphysical thesis about free will. We believe that people might 
rationalize low quality arguments that favor positions supportive of a Christian 
worldview. However, a particular view on free will does not appear to be one of these 
positions. Christianity seems flexible with respect to the nature of free will. This appears 
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to undercut the claim that Christians are susceptible to motivated reasoning about 
arguments that support incompatibilism about free will. 
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